A shadow of
doubt is spreading over the negotiation between Iran and world powers as the
gap over the key issue of the acceptable size and scope of the Iranian
enrichment program slowly reveals itself as unbridgeable. The inability to
solve this one issue, which exists among so many others, has resulted in the
real risk that all the efforts deployed in the past year to reach a long-term
agreement may have been in vain.
We should thank
all those who have racked their brains to produce ingenuous formulas in order
to break the present deadlock, particularly Robert Einhorn, former special
advisor at the State Department, the International Crisis Group, and the Arms
Control Association. Their proposals turn more or less around the same
principle: less centrifuges now for more later. In other words, Iran should
dismantle most of its installed centrifuges in exchange for the possibility of
expanding its enrichment capacity when the international community’s confidence
in Iran’s peaceful intentions is restored and a real enrichment need emerges.
We have no
guarantee that such recommendations will make their way into the minds of the
negotiators, who are immersed in their own information, constraints and
tactics. Due to domestic politics, the Iranians will obviously have the
greatest difficulty in dismantling even part of their active 9,000 centrifuges.
As a result of all the spinning around the technically sound but somewhat
politically inflated “breakout” issue—that is, the time necessary for producing
enough highly enriched uranium for a first bomb—the West faces difficulty in
accepting the Iranian enrichment program in its present format. It also worries
that this still modest program could develop one day into industrial
dimensions, which could theoretically result in dozens of bombs every year.
Hence the present deadlock around the enrichment issue.
At the same
time, there are solutions at hand for most of the other issues in this
negotiation, which is why it would be highly unfortunate to see the whole
process collapse over one missing piece. So the question is: what are the
options for solving this ultimate problem and achieving a comprehensive agreement?
Tactics
Firstly, Iran
and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, China, Russia plus Germany) must keep
drafting their final agreement as if the enrichment issue was solved. Thus they
should hopefully be able put together a text in which only a few formulas, a
few figures, and perhaps a paragraph or two would be left in brackets. This
method would give the critical observers of the negotiation (the US Congress,
the Iranian Majles…) a chance to evaluate what could be gained from
success, and what could be lost in the case of failure. In other words, the
enrichment issue would be put into proper perspective within a wider context.
Temporary Limits
Coming to the
substance of the issue, we already know that the Iranian side is ready to cap
its enrichment activity at 5%, to submit it to reinforced safeguards from the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to transform most of its
low-enriched uranium into dioxide—an improper form for immediate further
enrichment. But pointing to any precise ceiling for the number of authorized
centrifuges instantly raises opposing protests: too few for the Iranians, too
many for the West.
The “breakout
time” issue raised by the West could nevertheless be addressed by stating that
Iran’s enrichment capacity should not allow it to acquire, for example, in less
than six months an amount of 80-90% enriched uranium containing a “significant
quantity” of uranium 235 (about 25 kilograms of the material necessary for one
bomb, according to the IAEA definition). The six-month timeframe is proposed
here because it has been evoked by Secretary of State John Kerry himself as a
potential, if not readily acceptable, “breakout” delay. Such a formula would
compel Iran to keep no more than about 9,000 operating centrifuges of its
prevalent IR.1 model. But this upper limit would be reduced in due proportion
if Iran chose to keep a significant stockpile of low-enriched uranium in
hexafluoride form ready for further enrichment, or if it decided to replace
these first-generation centrifuges with more advanced models. All existing
centrifuges beyond the number determined by this formula would be kept in
special storage as backup elements. All of this, of course, under the tight
control of the IAEA safeguards department, which has all the necessary
expertise for the fine-tuning of such rules.
Towards an Industrial Enrichment Program
Next is the
question of how long this constraining framework will last. We know that Iran
wants to develop its enrichment program into one of industrial scale in
order to feed the Bushehr reactor, and any future nuclear power
plants that are built, at least partially with indigenously produced
low-enriched uranium. Until now, the discussion about the duration of the
temporary limits to be imposed on the enrichment program has cited a number of
arbitrary figures, ranging from three to 20 years. Would it be possible to
address more precisely the “practical needs” (as cited in the Joint Plan of
Action) of Iran’s nuclear energy program?
As regards the
Bushehr reactor, we know that the Russians will supply the necessary fuel for
at least eight more years. After that period, it would be necessary to know if
Moscow would agree to permit the Iranians to feed the reactor with home-made
fuel, possibly produced under Russian supervision. The same question would
arise with the reactors that the Russians build in Iran if the ongoing
negotiation between Moscow and Tehran leads to an agreement.
All in all, the
most practical solution would be for Iran to accept limits on the number of its
centrifuges (to thus ensure that it would be unable to produce the material
necessary to build a bomb in less than six months) and thus forgo
industrial-enrichment capacity until it develops a fuel-fabrication
capacity (in cooperation with another country, if necessary) and builds
one or two new reactors that will be fueled, at least partially, by
indigenously produced low-enriched uranium. Concerning the new reactors, Iran
could strike a deal with Russia (or, less likely, another country) to rapidly
build two or more reactors on its Bushehr site—or possibly even more reactors
elsewhere—that would be partially fed with Iranian-made fuel. In such a case,
the “practical needs” horizon for an enrichment industrial capacity would be
around seven years at the earliest. Or, absent an agreement with Moscow, Iran
could decide to develop its own line of reactors. Given all the difficulties
involved in developing indigenous reactors, the “practical needs” timeline
would be substantially lengthened. The horizon for an enrichment industrial
capacity in that scenario could hardly be shorter than 15 years.
So there is no
reason to decide beforehand when exactly to lift the constraints on Iran’s
enrichment activities without knowing the path that Iran will
ultimately follow for the development of its nuclear energy program. The
adoption of the two objective criteria mentioned above—the possession of a fuel
fabrication capacity certified by the IAEA, and the on-going construction of
new reactors to be fed, at least partially, with indigenous fuel—should be
enough for finding at the present time an agreement between Iran and the P5+1.
*
The proposals
presented here could be attacked by nuclear experts, since they tend to blur
the hard facts and figures on which their flawless solutions are based. Scientific
and technical data are, of course, the indispensable building blocks of a
robust solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis, but they should not become so
intimidating that they end up controlling the course of the negotiation. Any
agreement has to contain an element of risk and at least a minimal amount of
mutual trust. Let us hope that the negotiators, on both sides, will find the
inner strength to overcome their doubts and fears, while, of course, keeping
their eyes wide open.
